Pastoral Counselling . Oct 20, 2021 . 32 Mins Read . PC - Admin .
Keynote Paper
The theme of this Pastoral Counselling Conference, “Intentional Positive Nurturing Practices: Panacea for National Growth and Sustainable Development”, contains two key terms I would like to consider in my intervention. The two key terms are “nurturing” and “development”. What or how does one understand nurturing? What is understood by development? How are the two related? But there is a third term I shall be considering, and that is, academia. What is the role of the academia in nurturing and development? These and related issues are what I intend to speak about.
Clarifying terms and issues
The word “nurture”, found its way into the English language between 1300 and 1350 as “nurture”. Through the French word, “nourriture”, it is traceable to Late Latin word “nutritura” whose verb is “nutrire”, which is, translated into English as “to feed”, “to nourish”, “to suckle”, “to bring up”.[1] The idea of nutrition is contained in these words, and the purpose of nutrition, as we all know, is growth of an organism. To nurture, therefore, is to provide necessary nutrients for growth. But there is a caveat.
Growth and development are not and ought not to be used as synonyms. Growth is development only when it is life-giving. For example, a cancer a growth. But is an undesirable growth, an abnormal transmutation of biological cells. It is not the kind of growth that is beneficial to life. When, in a society, level of crime and its sophistication grow exponentially, such growth cannot be called development in the proper sense of the term. The distinction between growth and development is best apprehended when we examine the word, “development”. Suffice it to say at this point, however, that while every development is growth, not every growth is developmental growth. What then is development?
Tracing the origin of the word “development” is a little riskier. Tracing its entry into the English language compels us to make two movements in history.[2] The first movement takes us to the period between 1350 and 1400, then the word “envolupen” came into Middle English from the Old French word “envoluper”. It connotes the idea of a covering, a wrapping. The Old French word “Envoluper” gave rise to the English word “envelope”. An envelope is that which wraps, that which covers. Clarifying that is the first movement of our etymological quest.
The second movement takes us back to the period between 1585 and 1595, when the word “développer” came into the French vocabulary. The prefix “de” is key here. It has to do with undoing an action. If the word “envoluper” means “to cover” or “to wrap”, the prefix “de” connotes undoing the cover, taking off the wrapping. From the verb “developer” comes “dévelopment” in French, “development” in English. One is in a position then to explain that development is the act by which one undoes the cover, the wrapping of a thing. That points a way to articulate an operative notion of development at this point.
Development, by way of its operative notion in this intervention, is a process of intelligent uncovering of personal and collective potentials in human persons. It is the unwrapping of a quadruple capacity in the human person to attain and sustain personal fulfillment within our collective fulfillment. I speak of this quadruple capacity in the human person as intellectual, ethical, technical and spiritual. This shall be explained later. For now, let me state that there is development when human beings, working intersubjectively, that is, collaborating as individuals and as communities, identify and remove whatever hinders the actualization of their individual and collective potentials. The intersubjectivity of developmental initiatives must not be lost on us here. For development is not a one-man show. Development is the attainment of excellence, of what the Greek philosopher Aristotle called arete, in every sphere of human existence. And, as the philosopher explains in his Nicomachean Ethics, excellence is attained not in isolation but in friendship, in a life lived in common with other persons who desire to attain excellence.
There is development when human beings collaborate in facilitating their self-realization within the realization of the common good. There is development when human beings collaborate to remove obstacles to the common good. There is no development where there is no actualization of individual potential, and there is no actualization of individual potential where there is no actualization of collective potential. There is no personal fulfillment where there is no collective fulfillment, and there is no collective fulfillment where there is no personal fulfillment. There is no fulfillment where there is no collaboration, no common life, no friendship. The extent to which a human being attains the good is the extent to which the human being works for his or her own good by working with others for the common good, and works for the common good by working with others for his or her own good. If then we speak nurturing, it has to be asserted, given what has just been explained that no one can nurture who is not a friend. To nurture is to mentor, and mentorship can only take place where the mentor and the mentee are friends in the Aristotelian notion of friendship. You cannot be nurtured to become a good footballer if you decide not to have as friend any good footballer.
There is one more element to add to this notion of development. It is an element that would query the often repeated but seldom interrogated notion called “sustainable development”, a notion which features on the theme of this conference as formulated.
The notion, as formulated, would seem to suggest that there is unsustainable development. I am, however, of the opinion that one cannot properly speak of unsustainable development. For development is, of itself and by its very definition, sustainable. Since there is development where the common good is either attained or on the way to being attained, that which intends the common good is itself sustainable. If it is unsustainable it is not in the interest of the common good, and if it is not in the interest of the common good it is not sustainable. If it is unsustainable it is not development but retrogression or stagnation or even corruption.
The operative notion of development in this intervention deliberately sidesteps a notion that would reduce development to higher economic indices and availability of technical infrastructure, maximization of profit for the sake of maximization of pleasure. It is quite possible to have positive economic indices-a strong currency, a high purchasing power, well-constructed roads, beautiful bridges, state of the art airports, sophisticated gadgets, decent accommodation, abundance of food and goods for consumption, whereas he one who benefits from all these still lives an unhappy and miserable life. The numerous breath-taking accomplishments of science and technology cannot be ignored. But human existence is larger than the economy, larger than the prodigies of science and technology. Human existence is not just a matter of science and technology. There are, apart from technical dimensions, intellectual, ethical and spiritual dimensions. Development is the personal and collective actualization of human potential and corresponding personal and collective fulfillment of human aspirations in the intellectual, ethical, technical and spiritual dimensions of human existence.
In the intellectual dimension, the human being naturally desires the truth and is endowed with the capacity to attain the truth, the capacity to fulfill the desire to know the truth. He is able to differentiate between truth and opinion, able to differentiate between philosophia and philodoxa, between, on the one hand, an authentic love of wisdom, and, on the other hand, a love of argument of an opinionated agitator who is constantly engaged in the interminable discussions of sophistry dressed in the stolen robes of philosophy.
In the ethical dimension of human existence, the human being naturally desires the good and is endowed with the capacity to attain the good. The good to be attained is the good understood. A misunderstanding of the good occurs when the intellective capacity fails to know the truth, the truly good, mistaking what appears to be good for the really good. Thus, error in the intellectual dimension manifests itself in wrong choices and in unethical conduct.
In the technical dimension, the human being desires to work and has the capacity to work not just for the sake of production and consumption, as contemporary consumerist culture would want us to believe, but to produce what would enhance, not what would degrade human dignity. Today, there is concern for the planet earth because, as Pope Francis has pointed out in his encyclical Laudato si, astronomically rising rate of production and consumption poses environmental concerns.
Underlying and sustaining these previously described dimensions is the spiritual dimension where the human being has a desire, a natural desire for God, even when there is no consciousness of the content and orientation of this desire. The famous words of Augustine of Hippo at the beginning of his Confessions allude to the spiritual dimension of human existence when he said to God: “You have made us for yourself, and our hearts are restless until they rest in you.” In this dimension, the natural desire for God is fulfilled by divine revelation when God unveils himself for us to know him.
Development takes place where and when there is growth of the whole person in all dimensions of human existence-intellectual, ethical, technical, spiritual. To nurture for development, therefore, is to provide nutrients and enabling environment that would facilitate the growth of persons and communities.
When we speak of development, we must interrogate the academia. As members of the academic community, we need to inquire: what is our role in this discussion? In concrete terms, what, given all that has been said thus far about nurturing and development, is the relationship between the academia, nurturing and development? What is the role of the academia in bringing about nurturing and development? That is the question I wish to explore in the next section of this intervention.
The academia, nurturing and development
To this interrogation, I shall respond by saying: the academia is a privileged locus of nurture and instrument of development. It is where we learn to gather the nutrients and build an environment needed for nurture and development. But it is important that we embark on another clarificatory quest by exploring the notion of academia.
The counsel comes to mind and must be heeded given by Josef Pieper, German philosopher and 20th century disciple of Thomas Aquinas, not to presume that everyone knows why Plato’s school was given the name “Academy”. Naming Plato’s school as Academy is, as Pieper recalls, “a purely external designation which has nothing to do with the essence of the school, let alone saying anything about its essence.” “Everyone knows,” presumed Pieper, “that the reason for, and the origin of, the name lay in the purely spatial proximity of the school to the grove of an Athenian City Hero (Akádemos).”[3]
However, the implication of the proximity of Plato’s school to the Athenian grove offers us a suggestion about what the academia is. The academia is close to, that is, resembles a garden, and in this garden is to be cultivated and found flowers and herbs and plants and fruits of knowledge and wisdom. The academia is “a garden” and “community” of knowledge and wisdom for men and women who wish to plant and nurture trees and flowers on which can be found fruits of development, of personal and collective self-realisation, a community of men and women who seek to renew themselves and our common life, who are animated by an unrestricted desire to know, and who, are decided and unflinching in their openness to old and new ideas of development. They, like the wise scribe of which Jesus spoke in the Gospel, bring out of their storeroom things old and new. The academia, envisioned this way, is the engine room of development. Without it, the wheel of development will fail to turn. John Rawls speaks of a “veil of ignorance” in the formulation of his theory of justice. Playing on his words, I shall say the academia is a market place of ideas that de-envelope, that is, unveil by inculcating knowledge and its application.
The academia so envisaged ought to be a place of democracy of ideas because in it can be found a complex diversity of ideas. And where there is diversity there is need for democracy. Without democracy in a place of diverse ideas, one idea will be imposed on others. Those on whom the idea is imposed are stifled. A province of knowledge encroaches on other provinces of knowledge. It would be a place where everyone thinks alike whereas no one is thinking because it is a taboo to question the usual way of thinking. In such a community, academic freedom will be violated. Where academic freedom is violated, development of ideas is prohibited and criminalized. Where it is against the law to think and or think aloud, there can be no development. There can be no development where there is no development of ideas. The academia nurtures development in persons and in societies. But an academic community loses its taste when it does not promote the academic freedom for which democratic is known. Where it is a taboo to think, potentials cannot be actualized. And because a developed polity is a cohabitation of individuals of actualized potentials, an undemocratic academic community will fail in its vocation of nurturing for development. A nation cannot grow where dissenting opinions are unwelcome.
In a polity of magnificent complexity such as Nigeria-multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and multi-ideological in character-obstinate refusal and persistent failure to cultivate a veritably democratic culture has manufactured in abundant but disturbing quantity a ready recipe for instability, a formidable obstacle on the path of development. The instability engendered has itself given birth to a land richly endowed by the Maker but inhabited by the most impoverished human beings on the planet. That is what it means to say Nigeria is the poverty capital of the world. The situation calls for a renewed understanding of what a university stands for before the university can play a leading role in nurturing for development through the cultivation of academic freedom. A university must live up to its own character and vocation if it is to lead in building a democracy. It is in this respect that I shall make the following four remarks.
By way of this renewed understanding, I shall reiterate that a university is and must be a place of academic freedom. Secondly, respect for and promotion and defence of academic freedom are prerequisite for a university to live up to its vocational consciousness as a place where development of ideas is nurtured for the attainment of development. Thirdly, respect for academic freedom paves the way for the integrity of education and for integral humanism. And fourthly, a university which respects academic freedom is itself an exemplary democratic entity.
Concerning the first, we cannot nurture in the absence of freedom. Yet, it would seem we that we can no longer take academic freedom for granted, and that is because our collective psyche as a society has been militarized. The academia in Nigeria, like the wider Nigerian society, is yet to recover from two bouts of pestilential military intervention in Nigerian politics. From January 15, 1966 to October 1, 1979, and from December 31, 1983 to May 29, 1999, the military deployed the modus operandi of tyranny on Nigeria, the same modus unleashed on other climes where tyranny is installed. By virtue of this modus, institutions that shape public opinion, such as the academia and the media, are stifled by outright abrogation or patent and latent abbreviation of free speech. Thinking aloud is criminalized. Intellective capacity, which is to be differentiated from Machiavellian astuteness, finds it difficult to flourish where it is a crime to be free and to think freely. But freedom facilitates actualization of individual and collective potential, a developed polity being a habitation of citizens of actualized potentials. A university cannot perform its function as engine room of development within a society when the academic freedom of its members is not respected.
Concerning my second remark, respect for and promotion and defence of academic freedom must be paramount if a university is to live up to its vocational consciousness. The vocation of a university is to be a universe of ideas emerging and flourishing in dialogue. The immensely precious intellectual output of Plato’s school in the grove of akádemos bears eloquent testimony to what the human spirit can accomplish when it is allowed to think freely. The university is a place where questions are freely raised by questing spirits, where answers are proffered, where answers proffered are placed under further scrutiny, leading to further questions and answers in the endless turn of the wheel of knowledge, a turn that propels the wheel of development. Where it is otherwise, the wheel of knowledge is halted, and where the wheel of knowledge is halted a nation of arrested development emerges because the nation is itself inhabited by citizens of arrested development.
On a personal note, my own intellect has been nurtured by Thomas Aquinas, a scholar who evolved in an environment of academic freedom. The University of Paris, where he reached the summit of his intellectual odyssey, was, like other medieval universities, very famous for its disputations.[4]
In his article “Chronologie des questions disputées de saint Thomas d’Aquin”, Mandonnet offered a description of those disputations by painting the picture of an “academic joust” in which a topic was presented to be discussed, with objections representing “different currents of thoughts” formulated, first by the masters present, then by the bachelors and finally, “if the situation warranted it, by students.”[5] This was how universities in the medieval societies of Europe provided a place of nurturing thus producing a blueprint for development. [6]
With that, I come to my third remark. It takes a university where academic freedom flourishes to be a place where the integrity of education is acknowledged, respected and protected in view of acknowledgment of, respect for, and protection of an integral humanism. There is, in such a university, what Pieper calls “an openness for the totality of things” that is vital for the renewal of the university itself, and, ultimately, for the renewal of the society. [7]
My fourth remark is this: a university that is open to the totality of things is, by that very fact, a democratic entity, a democratic environment which serves as incubator and cradle of leaders with democratic credentials indicative of a developmental temperament. At the conclusion of his essay “Openness to the Totality of Things”, Pieper had this to say:
I would like to venture to present the only concrete organizational suggestion I can contribute to the discussion about the renewal of the university. It is this: there should be room in the structure of the university itself for academic debate which spreads across the disciplines and faculties…This openness to the totality is…. not achieved by the simple fact that all of these specific disciplines exist under the same roof of the university. If it is to be achieved at all, this can only happen in the minds of the individuals who, listening and speaking, take part in the many-sided dialog between the disciplines. To be capable of this dialog and, indeed, to be open to it—this is exactly what constitutes the true university teacher. Over and above his scientific qualifications, he must be in a position to appreciate the relevance of his specific findings for the broader discussion which concerns the totality, and introduce them, without non-committal generalizations, into that philosophical conversation.[8]
No one would deny that a university is hierarchical, and its hierarchy is necessary. Grades of functions and functionaries are needed for the university to accomplish its objectives. But hierarchy and egalitarianism need not be seen in opposition. Hierarchy itself must be at the service of an egalitarian common life, a life in which everyone matters and every idea is worth considering in the process of making decisions lest the university degenerate into a Machiavellian contraption where princes are dressed in academic gowns, and, in an unhappy paradox, academic titles camouflage academic deficiency. In our hierarchical universities, even ideas of members of lower rank in the university community must be given attention. Here I recall a famous debate that took place in a university on this same African continent almost six decades ago. It was at the Catholic University in Kinshasa in 1960. The debate was on the possibility of an African theology. It took place, in the manner of medieval university disputations, between a young Congolese studying for his licentiate (masters) degree, Tharcise Tshibangu, and the founding dean of the faculty of theology in the same university, Professor Alfred Vanneste. Tshibangu later went on to become Rector (Vice Chancellor) of the same university. What was remarkable was the towering intellect of both, and the willingness of a dean to allow a debate with his student. Debates are integral to a democratic culture, not as an exercise in the love of arguments, but as an exercise in the love of wisdom. It takes a university of democratic temperament to host such a debate. T. Tshibangu—A. Vanneste, (1960).
A question and a lesson for pastoral counselling
In this paper, I have attempted to establish the relationship between the academia, nurturing and development. A university, by its name and character, must not become a place where power is knowledge, but a place where knowledge matters because knowledge is power. Nigeria will become humane and habitable only to the extent that she is driven by knowledge and not by power, by good ideas and not by subterfuge, by good ideals and not cheap compromises, by values and not by mere satisfaction, and her universities must show leadership in this regard. The remarks I have made prepare the way for a question which, I believe, should preoccupy participants in their discussions at this conference.
Since the conference has been described as pastoral in intent, and since the line-up of speakers is overwhelmingly composed of scholars of religion, I believe the question should be raised: in the light of academic freedom, which I have presented as a prerequisite for nurturing, one is permitted to inquire into the place of religion in our academic communities in Nigeria.
It goes beyond calling ourselves faith-based universities, as many private universities would call themselves today. Despite this self-identification of our faith-based universities, is there really room for religion in our academia? To what extent does religion enjoy academic freedom even in our faith-based universities? The question may appear unnecessary since most of our universities have departments of religious studies. But it is not. From the foundation of Nigeria’s premier University of Ibadan, theology has been excluded from the university curriculum.
To seek comfort in the existence of religious studies programmes in our universities would overlook the fact that there are three ways of engaging religion in the academia. The three ways, as I have explained in an earlier essay, are phenomenological, comparative and theological. The phenomenological and comparative approaches engage religion academically. The theological approach engages not only religion but religion and faith (Akinwale, 2007).
Concerning the first, religion could be engaged merely as a phenomenon to be study using reason alone. In this case, we may have philosophy of religion, sociology of religion, or even psychology of religion. We may study the tradition, rituals and ethics of a religion. This is the approach of religious studies.
Concerning the second, religion may also be engaged in a comparative approach. In this approach, one religion is studied on comparison with another religion. It is still the approach of our religious studies programmes. So, we have in the Benchmark for Academic Standard published by the National Universities Commission a programme for Christian Religious Studies, which would represent the first approach. Then we have a programme for religious studies. This would represent the comparative approach.
A third approach is the theological approach. While the phenomenological and comparative approaches would deploy reason alone, such that religion becomes the object of study of philosophers or social scientists who happen to be interested in religion, the theological approach would deploy not only reason but faith and reason. In concrete terms, it is an engagement of religion as a phenomenon, no doubt, but as an object of faith. It is the approach described by the credo ut intelligam of Augustine of Hippo, and the fides quaerens intellectum of Anselm of Canterbury. While the phenomenological and comparative approaches of our religious studies programmes engage religion as a phenomenon, the theological approach engages religion and faith academically with the intention of search for and establishing the conceptual possibility of what is believed and practiced. The theological approach is that of a scholar who is a believer, not of a scholar who may not necessarily be a believer but happens to be interested in religion.
The theological approach has as its soul divine revelation. In the Christian context, pastoral activities are nourished by divine revelation prayerfully and intelligently interpreted. Revelation is the theological synonym of development in so far as the English word “revelation” translates the Latin “revelatio” which in its turn translates the Greek “apocalupsis”, which means unveiling. Christian revelation, the soul of Christian theology, is the unveiling the face of God by God himself. This unveiling takes off the veil of ignorance about God and ignorance about the human person. As Athanasius of Alexandria explains in his treatise De verbo incarnato, the revelation of God in the incarnate Word of God took away ignorance of the nature of God occasioned by sin, an ignorance that made human beings to lapse into idolatry and the corruption of mortality.
I dare say that there is widespread pastoral malpractice in Nigeria because of ignorance of religious knowledge, an ignorance engendered by an obstinate refusal to engage religion and faith academically. Such engagement will involve putting some questions to religion and faith, not in the way of adversarial questioning, but in the way of a quest for understanding that demands bringing faith and reason together to show that the act of faith is indeed an intelligent act, not just an outburst of emotions. The question to be put to religion are these: what do you stand for? What do you teach? How are we to understand what you preach? This is the theological task that the academia must assume but which is very rarely assumed by the academia in Nigeria because we have departments of religious studies, we rarely host departments of theology. Failure to address these and related questions has led to a deplorable state of preaching inimical to pastoral counselling and religious nurturing. It shows itself in many dubious pastoral practices in contemporary Nigerian religiosity.
The most visible symptom of the absence and or deplorable state of theological scholarship in Nigeria is widespread abuse of Scripture in the mishandling of Biblical texts. This abuse of Scripture is reinforced by widespread ignorance of Biblical languages. It is enabled by exegetical incompetence, rooted in disregard for apostolic tradition and ignorance of the achievements of the patristic era-an era whose writers and writings were able to bring together spiritual, intellectual and pastoral concerns. It is ignorance of the achievements of the patristic era that would make a preacher declare that Christmas is a pagan feast. Our country has become a place where people become pastors without any theological formation, where preachers take no cognizance of historical contexts of texts, where preachers care less about the meaning of scripture passages within the context of the text. Christianity in Nigeria is populated by preachers who are reading into the text instead of reading from the text. It paves the way for our Christian religious discourse to be hijacked by persons with leftist or rightist ideological agenda. It is obvious that what has just been described does not augur well for pastoral counselling. For if the pastoral counsellor does not know how to read the Bible, of what Christian value is the counsel he is offering. The matter is compounded when ignorance of findings of social sciences is added to exegetical incompetence.
The authentic Gospel is a person, not just a message, not primarily an ethical code. The Gospel is a person, and that person is Jesus Christ. But we hear sermons that are mere inspirational pep talks without any reference to Jesus Christ. Preaching without Jesus Christ may be an inspirational pep talk on how to attain a business breakthrough and upward movement on the social ladder. But it is not the Gospel preached by Christ. The greatest threat to Christianity in Nigeria is not Islam but Christian preachers who abuse the text of scripture. Abuse of the text of scripture issues from and leads to corruption of the Christian religion, and Nigerians are suffocating from toxic fumes issuing from corrupt religion.
In a nutshell, the way of nurturing by pastors demands a thorough and competent reading and comprehension of the texts of the Bible and of the Christian tradition, adequate theological formation, which is not the same as religious studies, and formation in human and social sciences. It takes pastors who are formed this way to detoxify religion in Nigeria and restore order and sanity to what we call Christianity in Nigeria.
References:
Akinwale, A. (2007). “The Place of Theology in the University Curriculum” in The Idea of an African University: The Nigerian Experience Nigerian Philosophical Studies, II Edited by Joseph Kenny (Washington DC: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2007) 141-160.
Cf. T. Tshibangu—A. Vanneste, “Débat sur la théologie africaine” Revue du Clergé Africain XV 4 (1960) 333-352.
James V. Schall, “On What is Worthy of Our ‘Veneration’” in Josef Pieper, What Does “Academic” Mean?).
Josef Pieper, “Openness to the Totality of Things” 77[1] Cf. dictionary.com/nurture. and D. P. Simpson, Cassell’s Latin Dictionary: Latin-English, English Latin (New York: Macmillan, 1959) 400. See the entries on “nutriment”, “nutrimentum”, “nutria” and “nutrix”.
[2] Cf. dictionary.com/development.
[3] Josef Pieper, What Does “Academic” Mean? Two Essays on the Chances of the University. Trans from German by Dan Farrelly (South Bend, IN: St Augustine Press, 2015) 3.
[4] As Pieper pointed out, “When indeed the schools of Paris Oxford, Padua, etc, started to call themselves “university” from the beginning of the thirteenth century they were in no way seeing themselves as something new but as the continuation and development of the school at the grove of Akádemos, which Plato a leading ancestor of all Western philosophers, founded in Athens one and a half millennia previously….history has paid too little attention to the fact that the founders of the Western education systems, since the great Alcuin, have time and again referred to Plato’s Academy as a model for their own planning. Of course, the detail is not relevant here; but it is an important fact that Plato’s foundation also saw itself as universitas, as a teaching and learning society of people “whose soul”—as the Socrates of Plato’s Politeia says— “is always poised to reach out to the totality, the divine and the human” (Josef Pieper, “Openness to the Totality of Things” in What is Academia?, 58).
[5] P. Mandonnet, “Chronologie des questions disputées de saint Thomas d’Aquin” in Revue thomiste 23 (1928) 267-269, quoted in Marie-Dominique Chenu, Toward Understanding St. Thomas (Chicago: Henry Regenry Company, 1964) 90-91.
[6] It is noteworthy that the format of the disputation is replicated in the procedure of documentation of every article found in the Summa theologiae, the magnus opus of Thomas. The Summa theologiae, in its vast documentation of objections and replies, turns out to be an intellectual exercise in democratic reasoning. In each of its articles, the reader is able to witness a willingness to listen to different currents of thoughts on the part of its author. Aquinas did not profess democracy. But he practiced it on the pages of the Summa. The format of disputatio replicated in the Summa provided a template for today’s doctoral thesis defence in modern universities.
It is equally instructive to note, with Marie-Dominique Chenu, another disciple of Aquinas, the place of objections in the disputation. A disputation was a dialogue in which objections functioned with the purpose of leading the mind on to the knottiest part of the problem…. In the language of the times, arguere [to argue], argumentari [to offer arguments], objicere [to set forth] are words all synonymous with the term disputare, so that objicere and objection [setting forth] do not, in themselves and always, have the meaning that the word “objection” today denotes. Objicere is to inducere rationes [bring in reasons] in favour of the one or the other part, it is not to oppose a fact or an argument against a previously established thesis. If the latter were the case, things would be reversed insofar as the dynamics of the dialectical process are concerned. Such a reversal, harmless in appearance, would destroy the cogency for inquiry which is pressing continuously from one end to the other the pro and contra proposed in the question, and which leads the mind on to its highest working pitch. An objection, in the modern sense of the word, would be, in XIIIth century style, an instantia, an obviato, words indicating resistance. The medieval “objection,” on the contrary, was in reference to the open quest of a problem’s intelligibility, in-ducere rationes” (Marie-Dominique Chenu, Toward Understanding St. Thomas 94-95).
[7]On his part, James Schall, in his essay entitled “On What is Worthy of Our ‘Veneration’”, an essay introducing Pieper’s thoughts on the university, had this to say:
In its essence, a university is not an economic or business corporation, nor is it a political institution. It is not a church, a union, or a club. While it has relations to and dealings with all of these otherwise existing institutions of culture and public order, it is itself. It is “set apart” lest the highest things we can know through serious reflection be neglected. Yet, contrary to much popular impression, the university is not hostile to the ordinary life of man. It has its own justification and thus requirements. The word “university” obviously comes from and refers to the notion of all things that are. The university is, ought to be, a place wherein everything can be discussed—not just discussed, but known as true or false. It is widely lamented that under a regime of political correctness, the university is precisely a place where only some things, usually popular or ideological things, are permitted access and funding. When this limitation happens, the university becomes, as it were, an “anti”-university. The university is a dangerous place both because of the power of bad ideas, but also because the truth must not only be known but chosen when known. We are free not to so choose, and such is our doom. This latter possibility is also something that belongs to a university to understand, as any reader of Augustine knows (James V. Schall, “On What is Worthy of Our ‘Veneration’” in Josef Pieper, What Does “Academic” Mean?).
[8] Josef Pieper, “Openness to the Totality of Things” 77